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Abstract
This study investigates the alleged disintermediation of banks’ traditional
deposit-taking in favour of investment management activities. Using data
on Australian bank-affiliated funds and a nine-year record of the parent
banks’ liability balances, this study finds that managed funds do not displace
bank liabilities. Prudential capital adequacy requirements dissuade banks
from using in-house managed investments as indirect conduits for raising
funds in the same manner as deposit-taking.
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1.

Introduction
The phenomenal growth of the managed fund sectors has led to claims of a considerable

decline in the role of banks in financial intermediation. Consensus appears to be settling
around a new theory of intermediation that recognises that banks have simply rearranged their
business to offer new forms of intermediation that have emerged out of financial markets’
demand for additional services beyond the asset transformation aspect of intermediation.
Allen and Santomero (1998 and 2001) have led the recent debate on the need to take risk
management and the cutting of participation costs, for example, as important factors to
consider in determining what intermediaries do. The new theory of intermediation has
encouraged the acceptance of the notion that the business of banking, under a strong challenge
from financial market participants such as managed funds, is being redefined to encompass
such non-traditional activities.
The motivation for this paper is that in the absence of explicit empirical evidence on the
substitutability of bank liabilities and managed fund products, managed fund activities
continue to be associated with the decline in relative quantum and economic importance of
bank deposits. Gallo et al (1996) contend, with reference to the late 1980s and early 1990s in
the US, that declining interest rate levels prompted a shift in household savings from
traditional bank deposits to managed funds. This shift is alleged to have pushed banks, fearful
of disintermediation, into the managed fund business.1 Commenting on the question of the
indispensability or otherwise of commercial banks, Scott (1998) asserts that savings and time
deposits at banks might be under threat as managed funds become an alternative for the
current payment system. This view extends a trend, triggered off by the rapid growth of
alternatives to traditional intermediaries, that associates investment managers with “banks of
the future” (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1993).
A belief persists that if practitioners treat bank products and managed fund offerings as
substitutes, compounded by a possible similar perception by depositors, this could lead to
funding problems for banking institutions. Managed funds may be profitable business lines
for banks, but the enforcement by prudential authorities of the principle of separation between
the banking and funds management activities housed under a single corporate entity dictates
funds raised this way are not equivalent to other forms of liabilities such as deposits. Keeton
(2001), for example contends that the movement of investments from deposits to managed
funds is the largest contributor to the failure by US banks, particularly small ones, to meet
local credit demands.2 The seriousness of the issue is illustrated by the issuance of a warning
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in November 2001 by Standard and Poor’s that the funding pressures being faced by banks
due, in part, to the waning of the traditional low-cost deposit base as customers increasingly
shift towards higher yielding investment options such as managed funds, “could contribute
incrementally to negative ratings sentiment in the Australian banking market”.3
This paper uses panel data on monthly bank liability balances over nine years and a
dataset of managed funds covering nine years to quantitatively document the displacement or
otherwise of investment-type bank liabilities by internally-produced managed funds products.
The next section of the paper provides background aggregate data on the trends of bank
deposit balances relative to other investment products and briefly reviews the relevant
literature. Section 3 develops a testable model for the displacement of banking products by
managed funds. Section 4 describes the data used in this paper and Section 5 presents the
empirical results. Section 6 summarises and concludes the paper.
2.

Background

2.1

Has the Importance of Bank Deposits Declined?
The available aggregate data on bank deposits and managed funds show a somewhat

diminished role for traditional deposits but do not lend direct support for the idea that this has
been a result of the shift of depositors to managed funds. Figure 1 carries two graphs of the
market share enjoyed by bank deposits relative to cash management trusts (CMTs),
superannuation funds and unit trusts.4 Figure 1A depicts the market share in terms of
economic importance by expressing the funds under management in the four investment
classes as a percentage of the gross domestic product. The domineering position held by bank
deposits is challenged by the phenomenal growth in investments held in superannuation
owing largely to the introduction of a compulsory pension scheme with the promulgation of
the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act in 1992 which was projected to increase
employer contributions alone to 9% of total income earned by 2002-3.5 Indeed superannuation
assets rise from A$60 billion, or 14% of GDP, in 1988, to A$368 billion, 58% of GDP, in
2001. CMTs and unit trusts have also risen to 4% (from 1%) and 22% (from 5%) of GDP,
respectively. In comparison, however, deposits have increased from A$123 billion, 29% of
GDP, in 1988, to A$975 billion, 69% of GDP, in 2001.
Figure 1B graphs the results of adding up all the assets held in the four investment
classes and calculating market share ratios for each based on this total. The share held by bank
deposits has fallen from its peak of 62% in 1990 to 45% in 2001 whilst that of superannuation
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assets has risen from 27% to 38% over the same period. CMTs have increased their share by
just a percentage point to 3% whilst unit trust assets have recovered from a slight fall in
popularity in the mid-nineties in which they attracted 8-9% of market share to 14% in 2001.
Undoubtedly the demand for alternatives to bank deposits is sizeable. Whether the
trends that have culminated in this apparent demand are associated with a direct displacement
of bank liabilities, in particular by products offered by banks’ own funds management
divisions, is the empirical question this paper attempts to answer.
2.2 Research Related to Bank Participation in Funds Management
Kane (1995) stands out in challenging the market-centric cliché of the disintermediation
of bank deposits by querying why banks, faced with competition for deposits from managed
funds, have not simply structured products that offer managed fund-like payoffs instead of
establishing costly fully-fledged managed fund subsidiaries. Kane concludes that it is the
inapplicability of deposit insurance requirements to bank-affiliated managed funds in the US,
not-withstanding the credit enhancement implied in their association with the banks, that has
provided banks with an incentive to form managed fund operations instead of index-linked
deposit products. Kane points to Australia where, by the mid-1990s, at least one major bank
was developing such an index-linked offering against a background of the non-existence of
deposit insurance. Subsequently, almost all the major banks have developed index-linked
deposit products. However, they have also taken part in the frenetic mergers and acquisition
activity that began in the mid-1990s that has given the major banks large exposures to funds
management business.
To understand the drivers of the potential for the displacement of bank deposits by
managed funds it is necessary to consider supply (depositor) and demand-side (bank) factors.
On the supply side, contrary to the view encouraged by apparent investor shifts towards
market based investment vehicles, the physical attributes of managed funds do not fully
conform to their substitutability for bank products. Pilloff (1999) observes that, in spite of
similarities in safety, liquidity, accessibility and convenience, the lack of absolute capital
preservation guarantees, liquidity constraints and the continued dominance of bank accounts
in household finances preclude a verdict of substitutability.6
Supposedly, the existence of factors that differentiate bank-affiliated managed funds
from the rest of the market offerings may be relevant to their unique ability to attract bank
deposits. After analysing the portfolio composition of institutional investment managers, Del
Guercio (1996) finds that amongst US managed fund operators, “bank managers are more
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sensitive to prudent-man laws” and suggests that prudent-man laws may force bank-managed
funds to tilt their portfolio compositions in ways that may, over time, explain the performance
differences between them and non-bank funds. Koppenhaver (1999) examines money market
mutual funds and, finding that funds affiliated with banks outperform those sponsored by
other financial institutions, advances the argument that the abnormal performance may be due
to bank expertise in dealing with money market securities and issuers. However, Frye (2001)
explicitly tests for the existence of the performance discrepancy predicted by Del Guercio
(2000) and, despite finding evidence of more conservative investment practices by bankmanaged funds, cannot observe a significant difference in return profiles.7
On the demand side, the possibility to generate fee income may be the motivation for
banks to offer managed funds. By marketing investment products, banks convert a portion of
spread income from deposits into fee income. This has been documented in the context of the
cross-selling potential in mergers of banks and investment management entities (Berger et al,
2000). However, DeYoung and Roland (2001) note that income from managed fund activities
and other fee-based services is characterised by higher short-run fluctuations than revenue
from traditional lending business.
3.

Development of a Testable Model
The nascent literature on the disintermediation of bank deposits in favour of managed

funds suggests that managed funds and bank liabilities are substitutes. Taken to its extreme,
this prediction implies that an increase in managed fund (MF) balances should lead to a
decrease in bank liabilities (BL). This phenomenon could be described by the following BL to
MF displacement ratio:
BLRNMF = BLRMF + αMFRMF,

(1)

where BLR is the ratio of total bank liabilities to total assets defined as the assets held by the
bank; MFR is the ratio of bank subsidiary managed fund aggregate balances to bank total
assets; NMF and MF denote a bank without managed fund operations and one that has funds
management operations, respectively; and α is the MF-BL substitution coefficient.8
One view holds that the existence of bank-affiliated managed funds reduces the banking
sector’s reliance on traditional liabilities, implies that α>0 and conforms to three arguments
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that correspond to α values of exactly 1; 0<α<1; and α>1. A value of 1 implies that a dollar
of managed fund balances reduces potential bank liabilities by a dollar. Intuitively it appears
more reasonable to assume that since a bank may rely on indirect means of offering managedfund-like products to its customers, such as index-linked deposits, the more likely value to be
observed is 0<α>1. Imperfect substitution may also arise if, owing to the comparative
illiquidity of managed fund products, for example, savings in banking products are not
reduced one-to-one for an increase in fund balances. Observing a value of α>1 would confirm
that, indeed, banks are on a precipitous course towards the total delegation of the deposittaking function to their managed fund operations. Complementarity between MF and BL
corresponds to a negative α.
Assuming that the BLR of a non-funds managing bank is a function of a number of
control variables which reflect the characteristics that determine the banks’ BLR, then the BL
to FM displacement ratio can be rewritten as:
C (Control Variables) = BLRMF + αMFRMF = BLRNMF.

(2)

Rearranging the above, it follows that the MF ratio of a bank is:
MFRMF = -1/αBLRMF + 1/α(Control Variables).

(3)

To operationalise the equation, assuming that control variables can be identified, the
following linear model can be estimated:
MFR = λ0 + λ 1(BLR) + λ i+1 (Control Variables).

(4)

Turning now to potential control variables, this study adopts the following:
•

BL liquidity measured by the ratio of current deposits to total bank liabilities, henceforth
denoted BLQ. This variable reflects the portion of a bank’s liabilities that can easily
migrate to competitors or competing intra-group products.

•

BL size measured as the natural logarithm of total BL, denoted BLSIZE, and included
because size may reflect the bank’s ability to attract depositors who believe in the “toobig-to-fail” phenomenon or associate size with superior reputation. BLSIZE may also be
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partially indicative of the bank’s capacity to increase its liabilities in relation to both
prudentially and internally-imposed capital adequacy constraints.
•

Variability of BL calculated as the coefficient of variation of BL over the past year,
BLVA. A recent high variability history may be associated with a bank’s instituting of
measures to establish greater stability.

•

ASIC retirement savings account (RSA) approval status, assigned the dummy variable
RSAD. This dummy variable is included since there was a strong expectation that
retirement savings accounts would slow down the movement of savings from traditional
deposits into managed fund products.9 As customers can maintain RSAs as part of the
compulsory superannuation required by law, the market’s expectation that their
introduction would slow down the growth of other deposits would appear to contradict
Hubbard (1986) who suggests that the liquidity constraints that characterise pension
assets in general preclude the forced saving from displacing discretionary saving or
encouraging increased borrowings.
Having determined the potential explanatory variables for the level of managed fund

balances preferred by a bank, the model utilised to examine the relationship between bankmanaged funds and other bank liabilities is:
MFR = λ0 + λ 1(BLR) + λ2(BLVA) + λ3(BLSIZE) + λ4(BLQ) + λ5(RSAD) + ε

(5)

If MF and BL are substitutes, irrespective of the degree, α will be greater than 0 and
consequently λ 1, the BLR coefficient, will be negative. 10
4.

Data
In order to test the model developed in Section II this section utilises asset and liability

data provided by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) on all the banks that
operated funds management entities directly under the banking entity’s licence, as opposed to
a subsidiary in a holding company structure, and that were, therefore, subject to Prudential
Standard APS 120.11 The APRA dataset itemises for each bank the different components of
liabilities. This study treats the aggregation of interest bearing current deposits, term and call
deposits, certificates of deposit and “other” liabilities (including statement savings, savings
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investment, passbook and school savings accounts) as the investment-type liabilities that are
likely to be displaced by managed fund products. The liabilities that are excluded are noninterest-bearing deposits, “other borrowings” (not defined), bill acceptances and foreign
currency liabilities. On the asset side, the APRA dataset distinguishes domestic from foreign
currency denominated assets. This paper uses Australian dollar denominated assets to
normalise the managed fund assets and bank investment-type liabilities in estimating the
displacement model to avoid introducing the influence of currency fluctuations.
Individual managed fund data were provided by ASSIRT Research, Australia’s largest
fund ratings agency. The ASSIRT database identifies the institutional affiliation of the fund
managers and details the total funds under management on a monthly basis for the period
1992-2000 covered by the bank asset and liability data. In addition to cash management trusts,
the equivalent of the money market mutual funds studied by Pilloff (1999), which account for
only 3% of the assets under management in Australia, this study also includes cash and fixed
interest funds. The number of the funds used in this paper increases from 89 in 1992 to 190 in
2000, in tandem with the phenomenal growth in managed fund assets over the period. The
funds represent 69% or A$29.4 billion of the A$43.3 billion in assets under management held
by bank-affiliated funds at the end of 2000.
5.

Empirical Results

Since the banks that form the basis of this study are easily identifiable this paper
estimates the managed-fund – bank-liability displacement model using a sample that excludes
banks that do not operate funds-management divisions. Table 1 reports the estimates obtained
from OLS regressions of the model. Because of well-known autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity problems associated with models estimated with cross-sectional and timeseries data two provisions are made in coming up with the results. Firstly, to ameliorate
autocorrelation, models are estimated for each of the years in the 1992-2000 analysis period.
Secondly, each estimation is repeated to correct for heteroskedasticity using White’s (1980)
procedure and the results reported separately for each instance in Panels A and B of Table 1,
respectively. Two-tailed t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
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5.1

Analysis of Coefficient Estimates
The main finding of this paper is that the coefficient estimates on BLR are positive and

highly significant in the majority of the years with the only negative coefficient being
statistically insignificant. This result appears to rule out the substitutability of managed funds
for bank products and is strongly suggestive of complementarity instead. On the basis of this
evidence, it would appear the Australian antitrust authorities are correct in maintaining that
bank deposits and managed funds do not occupy the same market definition.12
Clearly, the observed complementarity is not exclusively strong. It could be conjectured
that some substitution effects occur at the margin as a result of banks’ indirect usage of
managed fund divisions as capital raising conduits. Prudential guidelines normally require
banks to set aside capital against any exposure to funds management operations in a
trusteeship or custodial role. However, in practice, banks are known to “reclaim” the lost
capacity to raise funds for lending via the funds management operations. For example,
observing that financial institutions fund their loans with both equity and wholesale debt,
primarily commercial paper, Pennacchi (1998) notes the commercial paper is sold to money
market funds that, in turn, invite investors to open transaction accounts with them. Indeed, in
Australia it is common for a bank-affiliated fixed interest fund, for example, to invest its
assets in financial securities originated by, or accounts operated by, the parent bank.
Additionally, as noted earlier in this paper, banks have been structuring index-linked products
that would appear to be close substitutes for managed funds; however, directly investigating
this issue is impeded by the lack of data on balances in such accounts.
The coefficient on BLSIZE is negative in all the years except 1999, an indication bank
liability size is negatively related to MFR. This is not surprising in light of anecdotal evidence
from market commentators that the biggest banks have been generally slow in growing their
funds management businesses, whether generic or acquisitive.13 The negative relationship
between MFR and BLSIZE also shows that although the investment classes are
complementary, there are factors other than the growth of funds under management that play
a significant role in increasing bank liability balances.
Assuming that an increased inflow of depositors’ funds into the most liquid bank
liabilities is a proxy for a certain sentiment against long term investments amongst the suite of
bank products, the existence of substitution effects between managed funds and bank
liabilities could be expected to be accompanied by a positive relationship between MFR and
the ratio of call deposits to total bank liabilities. Similarly, banks would be observed to react
to increased volatility in liabilities with increased managed fund balances to compensate for
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the variability of its liability base. The results reflected by the BLQ coefficient are mixed, with
positive, statistically significant coefficients almost being matched by negative ones.
However, the majority of the BLVA coefficients are negative, indicating that unstable deposit
balances do not necessarily lead banks to secure managed fund subscriptions as substitutes,
further diminishing the substitutability argument.
Retirement savings accounts are direct competitors of funds operated by the same
banking entity. It is, therefore, not surprising that in Table 1 the RSAD dummy indicating the
authority granted to operate the accounts is negatively related to MFR in the latter three of the
four years that banks have been allowed to offer them. This implies that banks that offer
retirement savings have been able to reduce their reliance on managed fund operations in their
quest to participate in funds management activities. Whether this trend will continue is a
subject for future research.
5.2 Econometric Issues and Robustness Checks
The results in Table 1 are predominantly similar for both the heteroskedasticity-adjusted
and non-adjusted estimates. The only difference of note is in the form of marginally lower tstatistics for the heteroskedasticity-consistent results. The explanatory power of the
regressions is high, as depicted by adjusted R-squared ranging from 48% to 93% on an
increasing profile that reflects the inclusion of RSAD as an additional variable in 1997, when
the account was first authorised, onwards.
The managed fund data include wholesale (institutional) funds numbering 21 in 2000
compared to 169 retail funds. To check whether the presence of wholesale funds influences
the results, the model is re-estimated on data that excludes the wholesale funds. The results
are not altered in any significant way in terms of the signs, magnitude and statistical
significance of the coefficients and are therefore not reported here. Similarly the results could
be affected by the aggregation of liabilities that are likely to be substitutable by managed
funds. The test results are robust to various combinations of the individual liability types.
5.3 The Role of Capital Adequacy Requirements
With substitution effects all but ruled out, it is noteworthy that treating managed funds
and deposits as complements is costly for banks in relation to capital adequacy requirements.
This is because banks are required to set aside capital as they increase their direct exposure to
managed fund activities. Furthermore, there is a strong suggestion that banks may use
managed fund operations to indirectly raise funds for the asset side of their business.
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Therefore, as a further test of the robustness of the results reported here, this study repeats the
regressions based on the substitution model tested on data for the individual banks spanning
1992-2000. Instead of the RSAD dummy variable, each bank’s capital adequacy ratio (CAR),
reported in the annual reports, is included. If regulatory intentions that are premised on capital
provision for incremental managed fund business taken up have a dominant effect, a negative
relationship between MFR and CAR should be observed.
The coefficient estimates for the individual bank pooled regressions are reported in
Table 2. The number of banks is reduced to five as two of the banks were not publicly listed
and, as such, did not report CAR histories, and CAR data on one bank is rendered noisy by its
takeover of a large bank during the analysis period. The results decisively rule out
substitutability as all the banks’ BLR coefficients are positive and highly statistically
significant. Caution should be exercised though in interpreting the high t-Statistics owing to
the statistical problems associated with pooled panel data noted earlier on. BLQ, the measure
of the proportion of liquid deposits held, and BLSIZE are confirmed to be negatively related to
MFR, although the results on BLVA are still mixed. Most interestingly, as predicted, CAR is
negatively related to MFR in all but one positive but statistically insignificant case.
Substitutability is dominated by complementarity and bank prudential regulations successfully
compel banks to set aside capital against managed fund exposure at the exclusion of most of
Pennacchi’s (1998) indirect capital adequacy recoupment effects. This may explain why of
late the largest Australian banks, having acquired stand-alone funds management companies
have delegated much of their managed fund business to these subsidiaries. The trend is
consistent with DeYoung and Poland (2001) who point out that bank fee-based activities
undertaken in non-bank subsidiaries are not subject to the stringent requirements to set aside
capital against such exposures that apply when they are operated under the licensed banking
entity.
6.

Conclusion
Managed funds that are run by banks may intuitively appear to be substitutes for bank

deposits. However, using a managed fund-bank deposit substitution model, this study finds
suggestive evidence that, empirically, managed fund assets under management and bank
liability balances complement rather than displace each other. The complementarity is not
exclusive though - in two out of the nine years constituting the analysis period a negative but
statistically insignificant relationship is observed between bank liabilities and managed fund
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balances normalised by total bank assets. Some weak substitution effects may be emanating
from such factors as the ability of bank-affiliated funds to invest in parent bank deposits, thus
indirectly replacing the banks’ capacity to raise liabilities that is lost to prudential capital
provisioning. To directly verify this issue, running the substitution model on individual banks
after including the capital adequacy ratio variable shows that the measure is negatively related
to the volume of managed fund business. Prudential regulatory requirements successfully
dissuade banks from using in-house investment management operations as an indirect conduit
for raising funds in the same manner as deposit-taking.
This paper also documents a predominantly negative relationship between managed
funds and the aggregate size of a bank’s liabilities, reflecting that despite evidence largely
supporting complementarity, there are factors other than the existence of a managed fund
undertaking within a banking entity that strongly influence the growth of the bank’s liabilities.
Observed high variability in bank liabilities is negatively related to funds under management,
negating the prediction based on the assumption of substitutability that such variability may
induce banks to increase their reliance on managed funds for raising monies to on-lend on the
asset side. Not surprisingly, the authorisation of banks to operate retirement savings accounts,
that are essentially managed funds in nature and tax treatment, results in a reduced reliance on
managed funds.
An interesting topic for future research could be an investigation of whether there is a
system-wide displacement of bank deposits by whole funds management industry, not only
products directly managed by banking entities.
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Notes
1.

Other reasons offered by Gallo et al (1996), quoting Kaufman and Mote (1994), for
bank participation in managed fund activity are 1) the deregulation of bank managed
fund activities past 1986; 2) the need to boost non-interest income to offset the decline
in net interest margins, a factor linked to the decline in deposits; 3) to reduce bank
unsystematic risk through diversification into new lines of business, citing Brewer,
1989; 4) to lock in scale economies by adapting the existing infrastructure to managed
fund activities.

2.

Keeton (1997) and Schmidt et al (1999) give the securitisation of mortgage and credit
card loans as the other reasons for the transfer of investor savings from deposits.

3.

See “Funding Pressures Increase at Australian Banks” Standard and Poor’s
FundsDirect, 29 November 2001.

4.

Cash management trusts are a form of managed investment in which the primary
investments held are in a wider range of money market securities than bank savings
accounts.

5.

See FSI 1997.

6.

Whilst Pilloff (1999) restricts the analysis to money market mutual funds (MMMFs),
this paper adopts a broader scope by considering cash and fixed income funds in
addition to cash management trusts (CMTs), the Australian equivalent of MMMFs.

7.

The so-called prudent-man rule was established in US courts in Harvard College v
Amory where it was held that “Trustees shall act in a manner as other trustees [later
referred to as ‘a prudent man’] would act under like circumstances”. See Del Guercio
(1996) and Cabot (1998) for historical accounts. In the Australian context, the
equivalent of prudent-man laws are the fiduciary responsibilities imposed on fund
managers by the Managed Investments Act.

8.

The logic applied in this section is based on the non-structural model popularised by
Ang and Peterson (1984) in the case of debt-lease substitution in firms. In the context of
this study the displacement ratio determines the proportion of deposits the incumbent
bank loses as a result of offering managed funds. If bank managed funds substitute for
bank deposits dollar-for-dollar, the testable hypothesis is that the displacement ratio is
equal to one.

9.

See Financial System Inquiry (FSI) (1997), page 119. The Australian Taxation Office
definition of an RSA is an account offered by banks, building societies, credit unions,
life insurance companies and prescribed financial institutions (RSA providers) used for
retirement savings and similar to a superannuation fund.

10.

The value of λ 1, however, is a measure of the MF to BL displacement ratio rather than
the BL to MF displacement ratio, α. Alpha cannot be determined by simply taking the
inverse of λ 1 due to the presence of a constant and other independent variables in the
regression model. However, should a substitutability relationship arise α can easily be
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determined by swapping the MFR and BLR in the above equation to treat the BL as the
∂BLR
= BL, MF
dependent variable, describing the following partial derivative:
∂MLR
displacement ratio.
11.

The investment management subsidiaries, with their parent banks in parentheses, are
ABN-AMRO Asset Management (ABN-AMRO Bank), Advance Funds Management
(acquired by St George Bank in 1997), ANZ Managed Investments Ltd (Australia and
New Zealand Banking Group Limited), Barclays Global Investors (Barclays Bank),
Commonwealth Financial Services (Commonwealth Bank of Australia), Macquarie
Investment Management Ltd (Macquarie Bank Limited), National Australia Financial
Management (National Australia Bank Limited), and Westpac Financial Services
(Westpac Banking Corporation).

12.

This view has been established in a prominent merger application in 2000 in which
Commonwealth Bank, one of the four largest banks in Australia, in its application for
the approval of its merger with Colonial, a dominant funds management group,
unsuccessfully applied to the Australian Competition and Consumer Authority (ACCC)
to have managed funds and trusts included in the market definition encompassing term
deposits and transaction accounts (Goddard and Walker, 2001). The ACCC
subsequently maintained separate definitions for the two product classes.

13.

See, for example, “Bank comes up fast in funds management”, Australian Financial
Review, 18 April 2000.
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Fig. 1A: Market-Share Held by Australian Fund Managers
A. Funds Under Management as Percentage of GDP
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Fig. 1B: Market-Share Held by Australian Fund Managers
B. Share of Total Funds Under Management
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Table 1: Annual OLS Coefficient Estimates of Managed Funds –
Bank Liabilities Substitutability
PANEL A – Heteroskedasticity-inconsistent results
Variable
Constant
BLR
BLQ
BLSIZE
BLVA
RSAD
Adjusted R2
Number of Banks
Number of Funds

2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
2.08
-3.49
4.27
5.86
4.79
6.15
2.95
0.97
1.56
(7.34) *** (-7.51) *** (10.89) *** (6.54) *** (22.12) *** (5.76) *** (10.56) *** (4.15) *** (3.02) ***
-0.21
0.22
0.18
0.22
-0.08
0.07
0.09
1.29
0.08
(-1.01) (1.19)
(7.28) *** (6.25) *** (-0.37)
(16.64) *** (5.44) *** (4.20) *** (4.05) ***
2.25
12.23
0.52
-1.33
0.51
-1.41
-1.17
-2.06
1.61
(1.44)
(11.85) *** (2.07) ** (-1.21) (1.32)
(-1.40) (-3.92) *** (-2.79) *** (2.62) **
-0.20
0.13
-0.39
-0.51
-0.44
-0.50
-0.23
-0.10
-0.21
(-6.34) *** (3.07) *** (-10.99) *** (-6.97) *** (-21.35) *** (-6.00) *** (-11.20) *** (-5.01) *** (-5.38) ***
-0.49
5.08
-3.26
-2.26
-6.37
-8.87
-2.09
5.89
-1.54
(-3.21) *** (12.59) *** (-6.83) *** (-0.95) (-14.78) *** (-4.67) *** (-6.63) *** (6.98) *** (-1.87) *
-0.09
-0.37
-0.19
0.24
(-1.52) (-7.34) *** (-2.47) ** (2.80) *** 0.75
0.93
0.75
0.72
0.87
0.78
0.65
0.64
0.48
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
190
182
160
164
149
144
129
110
89

PANEL B – White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent results
Variable
Constant
BLR
BLQ
BLSIZE
BLVA
RSAD

2000
1999
2.08
-3.49
(4.09) *** (-4.07)
-0.21
0.22
(-1.17) (1.54)
2.25
12.23
1.16
9.78
-0.20
0.13
(-4.11) *** (1.84)
-0.49
5.08
(-1.97) * (6.81)
-0.09
-0.37
(-1.26) (-5.98)
0.75
0.93
7
7
190
182

1998
4.27
***
(5.32)
0.18
(15.03)
0.52
***
2.03
-0.39
*
(-5.74)
-3.26
***
(-3.59)
-0.19
***
(-2.20)
0.75
6
160

1997
1996
1995
5.86
4.79
6.15
***
(2.07) *** (21.15) *** (3.69)
0.22
-0.08
0.07
***
(3.60) *** (-0.45)
(4.62)
-1.33
0.51
-1.41
**
-1.59
1.42
-3.12
-0.51
-0.44
-0.50
***
(-2.08) ** (-20.34) *** (-3.66)
-2.26
-6.37
-8.87
***
(-0.39) (-15.59) *** (-3.29)
0.24
**
(1.65)
0.72
0.87
0.78
6
7
7
164
149
144

1994
2.95
***
(5.32)
0.09
***
(16.73)
-1.17
***
-3.71
-0.23
***
(-5.33)
-2.09
***
(-3.60)
0.65
7
129

1993
1992
0.97
1.56
***
(4.17) *** (3.33) ***
1.29
0.08
***
(4.72) *** (2.05) **
-2.06
1.61
***
-3.27 *** 3.31 **
-0.10
-0.21
***
(-5.38) *** (-5.11) ***
5.89
-1.54
***
(6.49) *** (-2.72) *
0.64
0.48
7
7
110
89

Adjusted R2
Number of Banks
Number of Funds
Notes:
The dependent variable is the ratio of bank-affiliated managed funds’ assets under management to total
Australian-dollar denominated bank assets. BLR is the ratio of aggregated selected investment-type bank
liabilities to total Australian dollar denominated bank assets; BLQ is a measure of the liquidity of all bank
liabilities calculated as the ratio of current deposits to total bank liabilities; BLSIZE is the size of the bank’s total
liability exposure measured as the natural logarithm of total bank liabilities, BLVA is variability of bank liabilities
calculated as the coefficient of variation of bank liabilities in the analysis year, RSAD is a dummy variable
denoting whether the bank had approval to operate retirement savings accounts. The expected sign for the BLR
coefficient is negative if managed fund assets under management and bank investment-type liabilities are
substitutes and positive if they are complements. Two-tailed t-statistics are in parentheses and ***, **, and *
indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.
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Table 2: Pooled OLS Coefficient Estimates of Managed Funds –
Bank Liabilities Substitutability for Individual Banks
Variable ANZ
CBA
MBL
NAB
WBL
0.14
0.78
6.68
0.24
0.20
C
***
*
**
***
(4.68)
(1.70)
(2.54)
(4.45)
(5.81) ***
0.03
0.09
0.33
0.15
0.06
***
***
**
***
(55.76)
(2.04)
(4.04)
(235.48 ***
BLR (131.74
)
)
0.04
-0.31
-0.06
-0.03
BLQ -0.02
(-3.26) ***
(0.42)
(-0.50)
(-4.56) ***
(-2.85) ***
-0.04
-0.92
-0.02
-0.01
BLSIZE -0.01
***
**
***
(-4.57)
(-1.26)
(-2.05)
(-4.08)
(-4.69) ***
0.49
2.10
0.01
-0.07
BLVA -0.03
*
***
***
(-1.91)
(3.38)
(4.41)
(0.64)
(-2.22) **
-0.03
0.10
0.00
0.00
CAR 0.00
**
*
**
(-2.30)
(-1.78)
(1.17)
(-2.47)
(-4.88) ***
Adjusted
R2
0.83
0.99
0.28
0.25
0.91
Notes:
The dependent variable is the ratio of bank-affiliated managed funds’ assets under
management to total Australian-dollar denominated bank assets. BLR is the ratio of
aggregated selected investment-type bank liabilities to total Australian dollar denominated
bank assets; BLQ is a measure of the liquidity of all bank liabilities calculated as the ratio of
current deposits to total bank liabilities; BLSIZE is the size of the bank’s total liability
exposure measured as the natural logarithm of total bank liabilities, BLVA is variability of
bank liabilities calculated as the coefficient of variation of bank liabilities in the analysis year,
CAR is the total capital adequacy ratio for the bank. The expected sign for the BLR
coefficient is negative if managed fund assets under management and bank investment-type
liabilities are substitutes and positive if they are complements. Two-tailed t-statistics in
parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White’s correction). ***, **, and * indicate
significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels.

